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Global environmental studies, the precautionary
principle and homo respondens
H>GDH=> A7:
Introduction
It is time, urges American engineer George Bugliarello, for the humanities, science
and engineering to come together urgently on issues of the environment.
Bugliarello calls for a new trivium to “provide every educated person with a basic
understanding of the endeavors and instruments that help us address our world
 the humanities (in the noblest sense of the word), to civilise, science to un-
derstand nature and engineering, broadly defined, to encompass the kindred
activities that modify nature” (Bugliarello ). Their interaction, he suggests,
“shapes a new morality, which cannot be defined as the domain of a single
discipline or set of disciplines” (Ibid). The solution to the world’s environmental
problems, by extension, rests on the understanding and application of this new
morality.
The above prompts a number of questions. What collaborations are possible
between science, technology and other disciplines for the purpose of discussing
environmental problems within the growing field of global environmental
studies? How might the humanities civilise those who endeavor to understand
and modify nature, lest they should “put at risk the very survival of our species,
now propelled at breakneck speed toward an unfathomable future by scientific
and technological advances” (Ibid)? What is the morality that Bugliarello speaks
of and on what should it be founded? The following uses an interpretation of
Hans Jonas’ philosophical thought to explore these questions, starting with an
explanation of the collaborative relationship between philosophy, the social
sciences, and the natural sciences in the field of global environmental studies.
Civilising science and technology
I begin by asking the following question: what does it mean to talk of civilising
science and technology? What, for that matter, does it mean to talk of civili-

sation?
The word ‘civilisation’ denotes a state of or a process towards being civilised.
‘To civilise’ is ‘to make something civil’. Lexicographically, the word ‘civil’ (Latin
civilis; Greek politikos) has three cardinal meanings. First, ‘civil’ implies ‘of or
concerning a citizen’. In this sense, it is the opposite of ‘natural’. For example, the
ancient Roman jurists contrasted ius civile, the body of civil laws enforceable on
Roman citizens, with ius naturale, the natural laws dictated by human nature.
Second, it means ‘polite or refined’, the antonym of which is ‘uncivil’ (ie. ‘wild or
rough’). Finally, it denotes ‘civilian’, the opposites of which are ‘military’ and
‘ecclesiastical’.
These three meanings, while different in key aspects, essentially derive from
the fundamental meaning of ‘civil’ defined by Aristotle in Politics as follows:
And why man is a political animal [zôon politikon] in a greater measure
than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare,
does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses
speech [echei logon]. The mere voice [phônê], it is true, can indicate pain
and pleasure, and, therefore, is possessed by the other animals as well. . . ,
but speech [logos] is designed to indicate the advantageous and the
harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special
property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has
perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral
qualities, and it is partnership [koinônia] in these things that makes a
household and a city-state [polis]. (Aristotle : )
This citation contains two essential points in my view. First, that among
‘political’ (ie. social) living things, human beings are unique in having a political
character based upon the possession of speech (logon echein). Second, that the
speech (logos) of human beings is defined not by the expression of subjective
sensations such as pain and pleasure but, instead, by the discussion of public
subjects that all people share, such as benefit and harm, good and bad, right
and wrong. In short, the essence of speech is that it is a dialogue with others:
the possession of speech as Martin Heidegger comments with respect to
the above quotation from Politics implies “being of speaking to each other
[Miteinandersprechendsein] by way of communication, refutation, and confron-
tation” (Heidegger : , my translation).
Aristotle’s explanation introduces the fundamental meaning of ‘civil’ (polit-
icos; civilis) as the mutual discussion of the common important issues of one’s own
society (polis; civitas). All three of the above meanings of ‘civil’ (of or concerning
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a citizen, polite or refined, and civilian) may be traced back to this fundamental
definition. The first duty of citizens is to be civil, ie. to mutually discuss their
social matters. All citizens should be polite and refined, in order that their dis-
cussions are smooth and fruitful. Finally, all citizens participating in a discussion
should be civilians: they should avoid both military and ecclesiastical occu-
pations on the grounds that the freedom of speech and debate must be defended
from the intrusions of violence or religion.
Let us content ourselves with this too brief consideration of the word ‘civil’
and return to the main question of this section. What does ‘the civilisation of
science and technology’ mean? If ‘to civilise’ is to make something civil and being
‘civil’ implies the mutual discussion of the common important issues pertaining to
one’s own society, the civilisation of science and technology defines the state in
which science and technology engage in discussion with other disciplines, such as
the humanities and social sciences, on issues of importance to society. Issues, for
instance, such as the emerging global environmental issues and humanity’s
common need to keep society safe from potential environmental catastrophes.
The triadic structure of global environmental studies
The problem remains as to how science and technology can collaborate with the
humanities and social sciences to contribute to the discussion on the security of
human society. An instructive paradigm concerning this problem can be found in
Hans Jonas’ The Imperative of Responsibility (), one of the classics of envi-
ronmental ethics in the th century. The second chapter of this work outlines
a new paradigm that brings together ‘ideal knowledge’ (the humanities and social
sciences) and ‘real knowledge’ (the natural sciences) for the establishment of the
‘ethics of the future’. Jonas’ description of this paradigm is far from precise. With
additional explanation and reformulation, however, his ideas apply readily to the
new interdisciplinary field of global environmental studies, upon which the
future of human society may depend.
Jonas may be particularly helpful in elucidating that which I term the ‘triadic
structure of global environmental studies’. This structure comprises of three
elements, summarised as follows:
(a) The study of moral principles (philosophy and ethics). This aims to create
and provide the theoretical justification for new moral principles which
have hitherto not existed.
(b) The study of the practical application of moral principles. This explores the




technology, among others. It considers how to apply them to public
policy with the aim of bringing them to fruition.
(c) The study of hypothetical predictions. This study termed “comparative
futurology” by Jonas involves the scientific simulation of possible sit-
uations in the future. Natural sciences (mathematics, statistics, physics,
chemistry, biology, ecology, medicine, earth science, meteorology, hy-
drology, etc.) and also researches in environmental history (history,
archeology, paleoclimatology, paleobiology, anthropology, folklore, etc.)
fall under the study of hypothetical predictions. This is because simula-
tions of the future depend upon accurate simulations of past phenomena,
formed on the basis of archeological, historical and anthropological data
amassed by research in environmental history.
There are close relationships between these three studies that merit note. First,
the study of moral principles is related to the study of the practical application of
moral principles through the study of hypothetical predictions. This is because
the policies chosen for the most appropriate political application of certain moral
principles are dependent on the expected future results based on the present
potential enforcement of each policy, which is demonstrated by scientific simu-
lation (cf. Jonas : ). It follows that the study of the practical application of
moral principles has much to do with the study of hypothetical predictions
because, as stated above, the most appropriate policy to be selected in a given
context hinges upon its future results, which are estimated by scientific simu-
lation as accurately as possible. Finally, the close connection between the study
of hypothetical predictions and that of moral principles is such that new moral
principles cannot be found without forecasting the future. Jonas terms this
phenomenon a “heuristics of fear” and explains its origins as follows:
. . . just as we should not know the value of truth without being aware of
lies, nor of freedom without the lack of it, and so forth so also, in our
search after an ethics of responsibility for distant contingencies, it is an
anticipated distortion of man that helps us to detect that in the normative
conception of man which is to be preserved from it. And we need the
threat to the image of man and rather specific kinds of threat to
assure ourselves of his true image by the very recoil from these threats.
As long as the danger is unknown, we do not know what to preserve and
why. (Jonas : )
As Jonas elaborates: “we know the thing at stake only when we know that it is at
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stake” (Jonas : ). The creatively imagined malum or harm “has to take over
the role of the experienced malum” (Ibid) whenever “that which is to be feared has
never yet happened and has perhaps no analogies in past or present experience”
(Ibid).
Jonas’ heuristics of fear thus defines the relationship between the study of
hypothetical predictions and that of moral principles. First, the study of hypo-
thetical predictions discovers what threats the future may hold. Next, the study
of moral principles creates a new ethical theory that serves to avert the future
scenario that is feared.
The principle of prevention, precaution or both?
So far, we have seen how science and technology can collaborate with other
disciplines to contribute to the discussion on the protection of human society.
What should be the first principle of the protection we seek?
Comparing contemporary society with the ancient polis, Jonas has this to say
about the world in which we live today:
. . . the boundary between “city” [polis] and “nature” has been obliterated:
the city of men, once an enclave in the nonhuman world, spreads over
the whole of terrestrial nature and usurps its place. . . the natural is
swallowed up in the sphere of the artificial. . . Once it could be said Fiat
justitia, pereat mundus, “Let justice be done, and may the world perish”
where “world”, of course, meant the renewable enclave in the imperish-
able whole. Not even rhetorically can the like be said any more when the
perishing of the whole through the doings of man. . . has become a real
possibility. Issues never legislated come into the purview of the laws
which the total city must give itself so that there will be a world for the
generations of man to come. (Jonas : )
In the above citation, Jonas insists there must be ‘a world for the generations of
man to come’. I interpret this to mean that, in order to maintain human security,
we must not stop at the protection of only the present members of human society.
Rather we must extend protection to future generations, without which human
society will disappear, and to nature, which has been absorbed by its opposite, the
polis.
What, then, should be the first principle governing the protection of human
society, future generations and nature? Jonas states that “the prophecy of doom




Niggenmeier, among others, comments that Jonas’ proposition is archetypal of
that which we today call the precautionary principle a principle that “aims at
the orderly management of risks which cannot be elucidated completely by
science and demands to interfere so that what is worth protecting, such as human
health, may not be endangered by the possible occurrence of the unclear risk”
(Niggenmeier : , my translation).
Niggenmeier’s definition of the precautionary principle may be understood in
two ways, both as a ‘principle of prevention’ and as a ‘principle of precaution’.
These two interpretations are contrary, especially when they explicate the mean-
ing of ‘the possible occurrence of the unclear risk’. Olivier Godard explains this as
follows: “Precaution concerns potential or hypothetical hazards (uncertainty)
whereas prevention deals with known and recognised risks” (Godard :  ).
Godard redefines the principle of prevention as the principle of abstention
and describes it as comprising three ideas:  ) the concept of zero damage as a
general norm to protect the public from any possible harm;  ) the focus of
attention on the worst-case scenario against which we should remain alert,
regardless of any scientific uncertainty;  ) a shift in the burden of proof away
from the victim (plaintiff), who need not provide scientific proof of the harm-
fulness of a given act to the perpetrator (defendant), who must prove his own act
to be harmless instead (Godard : , my paraphrase and translation). Godard
grumbles that the followers of the principle of prevention (or abstention) attach
considerable importance to the worst-case scenario in projections of the future
and deem such scenario “certain in determining the prevention which should be
started” (Godard : , my translation). He identifies this stance as one of
pessimism (castrophisme) and blames Jonas, “the father of the modern pessimistic
philosophy” (Ibid, my translation), for this gloomy attitude.
In contrast to the principle of prevention, the principle of precaution, ac-
cording to Godard’s formulation, has the following characteristics: a) it does not
require the zero damage [norm], nor does it institute [the imposition of] respon-
sibility for consequence; the fact that some damages occur does not imply that
precautionary measures [against the damages] are maladapted; b) it does not
focus upon the worst-case scenarios that are associated with each undertaken
action but it considers all the scenarios that describe the possible effects of the
above actions; c) it does not demand the conversion of the burden of proof but
distances itself from the idea that proof should be charged or discharged or that
it is important to prove the damage or its absence (Godard : , my translation
and paraphrase). A strong believer in the principle of precaution defined in this
way, Godard clearly considers himself Jonas’ opponent.
Godard’s argument that the principles of prevention and precaution are
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mutually exclusive is not uncommon. I nevertheless contend that there is
nothing either/or about the principle of prevention and precaution. Rather, one
complements the other.
Let us begin by considering the principle of prevention. This principle is
arguably impracticable. However hard we try, we can never completely satisfy
its zero-risk norm: we are prevented from doing so by the inevitable fallibility of
the human condition, chronicled by human history. However, we must not as-
sume instead that the principle of precaution alone is sufficient to ensure social
safety. This is because this principle does not offer theoretical justification as to
why we must protect present and future human society and nature.
Jonas’ insistence that “metaphysics must underpin ethics” (Jonas : x)
provides the justification lacking if the principle of precaution is pursued in
isolation. Jonas’ proposition is the very raison d’être of the principle of prevention,
which differs, ultimately, from that of precaution in terms of its metaphysical
background. At the same time, however, Jonas reaffirms his belief that we must
“give the bad prognosis precedence over the good” (Jonas : ). “Never must
the existence or the essence of man as a whole be made a stake in the hazards of
action” (Ibid), he warns, citing “the imperative that there be a mankind” (Jonas
: ) as his reason why it must not. If so, then what is the basis of this
imperative? In response to this question finale, Jonas replies that “only the idea of
Man, by telling us why there should be men, tells us also how they should be”
(Ibid). Thus, the fundamental underlying premise of the principle of prevention
“does not itself lie within ethics as a doctrine of action. . . but within metaphysics as
a doctrine of being, of which the idea of Man is a part” (Jonas : ).
The above suggests that the principles of prevention and precaution should
be taken together rather than in isolation, and leaves us with a challenging
question: what does “the idea of Man” imply? As long as this concept is not
clarified, Jonas’ metaphysical justification for the principle of prevention remains
in doubt. If “the idea of Man” refers to Jonas’ ideal of human beings, a question
arises as to whether his argument is too dogmatic to merit approval. In con-
cluding, therefore, I would like to consider what Jonas means by the idea of Man.
The idea of Man and the responsibility for responsibility: homo
respondens
At first glance, Jonas’ concept of the idea of Man, which “tells us how they [men]
should be”, appears to refer to some definite model of human beings. Yet Jonas
himself states that the question of “what man ought to be” is an “ever-open
question”, the answer to which is “changeable” (Jonas : ). Jonas elaborates:
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But what now matters most is not to perpetuate or bring about a
particular image of man, but first of all to keep open the horizon of
possibilities which, in the case of man, is given with the existence of the
species as such and. . . will always offer a new chance to the human
essence. (Jonas : )
This citation indicates that Jonas does not intend to advocate any specific
exemplar of human beings; to the contrary, he argues that we must all contin-
uously expand “the horizon of possibilities” that constantly enables us to realise
our ideals as human beings and maintain the conditions that make it possible to
realise the “human essence”. Maintaining “the horizon of possibilities” is the
cardinal responsibility of human beings, Jonas suggests. To fulfil this respon-
sibility, the present generation must ensure that all future generations have the
same chance it had to experience responsibility. The responsibility of human
beings is, in essence, responsibility for responsibility. Jonas explains:
It is the ever-transcendent possibility, obligatory in itself, which must be
kept open by the continued existence [of mankind]. To preserve this
possibility is a cosmic responsibility hence the duty for mankind to
exist. Put epigrammatically: the possibility of there being responsibility
in the world, which is bound to the existence of men, is of all objects of
responsibility the first. (Jonas : )
Accepting for the moment that Jonas is right about responsibility, what is the
relation between the responsibility of human beings and the idea of Man? Jonas’
description of what the responsibility means to human beings may elucidate this
question:
To be de facto responsible in some respect for someone at some time. . .
belongs as inseparably to the being of man as his a priori capacity for
it. . . and is therefore to be included in his definition, if one is interested in
this dubious pursuit (Ibid).
As this citation clarifies, Jonas regards the state of “being responsible” not only de
facto but also a priori as that, in short, which defines the state of being human. I
interpret this to mean that humanity is not only ontically (in terms of concrete
ways of our being) but also ontologically (in terms of the fundamental structure
that makes our being possible) responsible: that is, homo respondens. Jonas insists
that the human ontological feature of homo respondens ie. the structure of our
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being that enables us to be responsible burdens us with the duty that we ought
to have responsibility (for responsibility). We must realise ontically our own
ontological character, in other words, as the following passage suggests:
Man’s distinction that he alone can have responsibility means also that he
must have it for others of his like that is, for such that are themselves
potential bearers of responsibility. (Ibid)
The features of homo respondens seen in the above can also be found in the
following explanation of the idea of Man, which Jonas provides in relation to “the
imperative that there be a mankind” (Jonas : ):
With this imperative we are, strictly speaking, not responsible to the
future human individuals but to the idea of Man, which is such that it
demands the presence of its embodiment in the world. It is, in other
words, an ontological idea, which does not. . . guarantee the existence of its
subject already with the essence far from it!  but says that such a
presence ought to be and to be watched over, thus making it a duty to us
who can endanger it. (Ibid, my italics)
In this passage, Jonas states that the idea of Man requires human beings to be “its
embodiment in the world”. In other words, the idea of Man makes “the ontological
claim” (Jonas : ) for the “abstract ‘ought’ ” (Ibid) to be “its executors or
guardians” (Ibid) against us, just as homo respondens does. The idea of Man and
homo respondens are the same in that both are human ontological concepts
demanding that humanity should be their incarnation.
The above offers an exploration of Jonas’ concept of the idea of Man in an
attempt to clarify its meaning. Having suggested that the idea of Man and homo
respondens are one and the same, we now need to ask the following question: can
Jonas’ central thesis that responsibility is the ontological character of human
beings be justified and, if so, how?
Jonas builds his thesis of responsibility on his unique teleological philosophy
of nature, arguing that life is a good in itself and that human responsibility is the
highest product of the evolution of life. Jonas’ proposition that human respon-
sibility should be based upon the ontological structure of human beings is per-
suasive. His attempt to justify the proposition is less persuasive, however, in that
the teleology of Jonas’ natural philosophy is not supported by Darwinism. Laying
out the ontological foundation of human responsibility is clearly the next step in




I presented the theme introduced in this paper at an international conference of specialists in
environmental studies, which took place on  and  June . My presentation was part of a special
panel that discussed the topic ‘civilising modern science and technology for a new civilisation’. The
event the ninth Kyoto University International Symposium: Integrating Global Environmental
Studies Towards Human Securitywas co-organised by the Graduate School of Global Environ-
mental Studies, the Field Science Education and Research Centre and the Kyoto Sustainability
Initiative. This paper revises my presentation (which had the original title, The Civilisation of Science
and Technology for an Integrated System of Global Environmental Studies: an Interpretation of Hans
Jonas’ The Imperative of Responsibility) substantially for the purpose of publication in Sansai.
Notes
 In order to simplify the explanation, I do not refer to ius gentius (the law of nations) here.
 The influence of Jonas’s work upon politicians and environmental activists prompted Wolfgang Müller to claim
that “the UN conference for environment and development in Rio de Janeiro  is hardly thinkable without the
impulse of Hans Jonas” (Müller : , my translation).
 “We consult not our successors’ wishes. . . but rather the “ought” that stands above both of us. To make it
impossible for them to be what they ought to be is the true crime. . . This means, in turn, that it is less the right of
future men (namely, their right to happiness) than their duty over which we have to watch, namely, their duty to be
truly human”. (Jonas 	: 		)
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